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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) and Utah 
Const, art. VIII, § 3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the court correctly find that Plaintiffs had no standing to challenge 
Defendants' alleged attorney fee splitting practices? 
2. Did the court correctly hold that Plaintiffs had no standing to challenge 
Defendants' alleged improper collection of treble damages, when Plaintiffs never paid 
treble damages to Defendants? 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Standing is a legal question reviewed for correctness. See Utah Bankers Ass 'n v. 
Utah Dep't Fin. Inst., 888 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Aldrich, Nelson, Weight 
& Esplin v. Dep't of Employment Sec, 878 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and rules are important to this appeal: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 (pre and post 1999 versions) (Addendum). 
2. Rules 4-505 and 4-505.01, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 
(Addendum). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs wrote bad checks that were referred to Defendant Bonneville Billings & 
Collections, Inc. ("Bonneville") for collection. Bonneville used its attorney, Defendant 
Ted K. Godfrey to collect on the checks. Defendants' strictly complied with Utah statutes 
that thoroughly regulate collection efforts. Plaintiffs nonetheless allege twenty-two 
separate causes of action that lead to two basic allegations: (1) improper attorney fee 
splitting; and (2) improper collection and retention of treble damages. 
Defendants moved to dismiss based on Plaintiffs' lack standing. Plaintiffs have 
not suffered a distinct and palpable injury giving them a personal stake in the outcome of 
this dispute. On June 3, 2002, Judge Frederick granted Defendants' motions. This timely 
appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Plaintiff Melanie Lloyd 
1. On April 16, 1999, Plaintiff Melanie A. Lloyd bounced a check to Conoco. 
See Complaint at % 27; R. at 6. 
2. The check was referred to Bonneville, which on April 30,1999 sent 
statutory notice of the dishonored check to Ms. Lloyd. See Complaint at ^ [ 29 and Exhibit 
"K";R.at6,55. 
3. On May 18, 1999, a second notice was sent to Ms. Lloyd. See Complaint at 
130 and Exhibit "L"; R. at 6, 56. Ms. Lloyd did nothing. 
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4. On June 13,1999, Mr. Godfrey, on behalf of his client, Bonneville, served 
Ms. Lloyd with a summons and complaint. See Complaint at *[ 31 and Exhibit "M"; R. at 
6, 58-60. 
5. At this point, Ms. Lloyd sent Defendants a check for $40.20. See 
Complaint at \ 32 and Exhibit "N"; R. at 6, 61. 
6. Because suit had already been filed, Mr. Godfrey sought another $160.00 
($150.00 in attorney's fees and $10.00 for court costs). See Complaint at \ 33; R. at 6. 
7. On June 25,1999, Ms. Lloyd paid the remaining $160.00 and the suit was 
dismissed. See Complaint at ^  34 and Exhibit "O"; R. at 6,62. 
8. To date, Ms. Lloyd has paid a total of $200.20, consisting of the face 
amount of the check, a $20.00 service charge, $10.00 in court costs, $150.00 in attorney's 
fees and approximately thirty cents in interest. See Complaint at ffif 32-34 and Exhibits 
"N" and "O"; R. at 6, 61-62. Ms. Lloyd did not pay any treble damages, nor were such 
damages sought by Defendants. 
B. Plaintiff Linda Haymond 
9. On February 24,2001, Plaintiff Linda Haymond bounced a check to the 
Flower Patch for $7.42. See Complaint at \ 9 and Exhibit "A"; R. at 3, 33. 
10. The check was referred to Bonneville, and Bonneville used Mr. Godfrey as 
its attorney to collect on the check. See Complaint at <[ffi 11-12; R. at 3. 
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11. On April 13,2001, Mr. Godfrey sent statutory notice of the dishonored 
check to Ms. Haymond pursuant to § 7-15-1(5). See Complaint at ^  13 and Exhibit "B"; 
R. at 3, 34. 
12. After receiving no response from Ms. Haymond, on June 13,2001, Mr. 
Godfrey served Ms. Haymond with a summons and complaint pursuant to § 7-15-1(7). 
See Complaint at \ 14 and Exhibit "C"; R. at 3,35-37. 
13. On June 27,2001, Ms. Haymond sent a cashier's check for $28.00 to the 
Flower Patch, the merchant that initially received her bad check. See Complaint at \ 15 
and Exhibit "D"; R. at 3, 38. By this time, however, $28.00 was insufficient to cover the 
amounts owing because of Ms. Haymond's failure to act in a timely manner. 
14. Ms. Haymond retained attorney Lester A. Perry to defend her in the 
collection action. See Complaint at % 17; R. at 3. 
15. In August and September of 2001, Mr. Perry sent two letters to Mr. Godfrey 
requesting various documents. In those letters, Mr. Perry also alleged that Mr. Godfrey 
split fees with Bonneville, and collected statutory damages that were prohibited by Utah's 
Dishonored Instruments Act. See Complaint at ffi[ 20-21 and Exhibits "E" and "F"; R. at 
4-5,39-41. 
16. On October 2, 2001, Mr. Perry filed formal discovery requests. See 
Complaint at \ 23 and Exhibit "H"; R. at 5,44-48. 
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17. Bonneville moved to dismiss the case against Ms. Haymond, and the court 
did so over Ms. Haymond's objection. See Complaint at ffi[ 25-26 and Exhibits "I" and 
"J"; R. at 5,49-54. 
18. Ms. Haymond only paid Bonneville $28.00, representing the face amount of 
the check and a twenty dollar service charge. See Complaint at \ 15 and Exhibit "D"; R. 
at 3,38. Ms. Haymond did not pay any attorney's fees or treble damages. 
LITIGATION BACKGROUND 
For years Plaintiffs attorney, Lester Perry, has been challenging the practices of 
collection agencies.1 He has had some success. Ditty v. Check Rite, 182 F.R.D. 639 (D. 
Utah 1998) (class action claim that a collection letter violated the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act settled after Judge Tena Campbell certified the class). Mr. Perry has 
challenged alleged fee splitting between collection agencies and their lawyers in federal 
and state courts, before the state legislature, and before the Utah State Bar. Despite such 
close scrutiny, Bonneville and its attorney's actions have not been found to violate the 
law. This lawsuit is another example of counsel's crusade against collection agencies. 
lPlaintiffs acknowledge this is their brief by stating that "counsel for Ms. 
Haymond and Ms. Lloyd has fought the attorney fee splitting issue against Bonneville 
and its attorneys in prior cases." Plaintiffs' Br. at 15 n. 1. See also Riddle v. Perry, 2002 
UT 10, Tf 4,40 P.3d 1128 ("Mr. Perry is an attorney who represents plaintiffs in class 
action suits against attorneys who practice in the field of debt collection."). 
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The fatal flaw in this effort is that his clients have no standing to challenge such practices 
because they have suffered no injury.2 
A. Pickering, et al v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc.y 95-CV-125-B 
In 1995, Mr. Perry represented a plaintiff who sued Bonneville and its lawyer in 
federal court, alleging that Bonneville improperly split fees with its lawyers. On the 
standing issue, Judge Benson wrote: 
The consumer plaintiffs' obligation to pay the statutory attorney fees in 
Rule 4-505.01 arises from the participation of attorneys in the collection 
case, not from the proper allocation of fees after the judgment has been 
paid. Only if attorneys were not actually involved in some material manner 
in the collection cases do the consumer plaintiffs have a claim based on 
their payment of attorney fees. Accordingly, if during discovery the facts 
demonstrate that there was more than a token or de minimus attorney 
involvement in Bonneville's collection efforts then the Plaintiffs may not 
have a cognizable injury at law, and the court would entertain a summary 
judgment motion to dismiss on this ground. 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, dated October 9,1996, at 5 {See Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss at Exhibit "1" ; R. at 245-
252).3 Judge Benson also stated that even "[i]f the Plaintiffs do not have a viable cause of 
2
 In the following sections, Mr. Godfrey refers the Court to two unpublished 
decisions and to a letter from the Utah State Bar. They demonstrate that Plaintiffs' 
counsel has taken this crusade against collection agencies to every available forum prior 
to coming to state court. Also, the Pickering and Heard decisions are factually identical 
to the case at hand, they were brought by the same attorney as the present case, they 
contain the same arguments involving alleged fee splitting, and they recognize the rule of 
law - that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert such claims. 
3Rather than appending a copy of the unpublished decisions cited by Mr. Godfrey 
in the Addendum to his Brief, Mr. Godfrey will refer the Court to his Memorandum in 
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action based on their lack of injury, an equitable outcome may still occur. In oral 
argument plaintiffs' counsel stated that the Utah State Bar and the Department of 
Consumer Protection have pursued this problem against Bonneville and the attorneys 
involved. These agencies appear to be the proper means of enforcement in this case of 
misused or misallocated attorney fees" Id. at 5 n. 3 (emphasis added). The Pickering 
case settled before trial and no class was ever certified. Plaintiffs' counsel carried these 
issues over into the Heard case. 
B. Heard v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc. et al, 2:97-CV-445C 
The next spring, another plaintiff represented by Mr. Perry sued Bonneville again 
in federal court, again alleging unlawful fee splitting. Judge Tena Campbell granted 
Bonneville's motion to dismiss for lack of standing: 
Even assuming that Bonneville's attorneys were improperly splitting fees 
with their client, plaintiff does not have standing to challenge this practice. 
* * * 
Here, plaintiff has suffered no injury from Bonneville's alleged fee splitting 
practice that could be redressed by a favorable decision. Plaintiff does not 
allege that the amount of attorney's fees collected from her by defendants 
was excessive. In fact, it is undisputed that Bonneville's attorney's collected 
the amount of attorney's fees authorized by rule 4-505.01 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration. Plaintiffs claim relates only to the later 
distribution of the fees collected by Bonneville's attorneys. Because 
plaintiff has suffered no concrete, particularized injury from defendants' 
Support of Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss. Each of the decisions was 
attached as an exhibit to that memorandum and, therefore, are included in the appellate 
record. 
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distribution of fees, she lacks standing to bring a claim based on 
Bonneville's alleged fee splitting practice. 
Order of November 30,1998, at 5-6 (emphasis added) (see Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss at Exhibit "2"; R. at 253-264). Judge 
Campbell added: "[i]f plaintiff suspects defendants are engaging in illegal fee splitting, 
the proper course of action would be to file a complaint with the Utah State Bar 
Association in hopes of initiating a disciplinary proceeding." Id. at 6 n. 3. 
Ms. Heard appealed Judge Campbell's decision, and the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the dismissal: "What Bonneville's attorney did with the statutory fees 
may violate state ethical rules. How that injures plaintiff, however, eludes us. It is the 
fundamental deficiency of Ms. Heard's stake in the outcome of the fee splitting issue 
which defeats her standing." Heard v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, 216 F.3d 1087 
(table), 2000 WL 825721 at *5 (10th Cir. 2000) (see Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss at Exhibit "3"; R. at 265-269). 
C. The Utah State Legislature 
Plaintiffs' counsel has also taken this issue to the Utah State Legislature. Mr. 
Perry testified before the Business, Labor and Economic Development Committee about 
amending Utah's "civil check law." See Riddle v. Perry, 2002 UT 10, ^ 4,40 P.3d 1128. 
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D. The Utah State Bar 
On July 6, 2002, Mr. Perry filed a lengthy complaint with the Utah State Bar 
alleging that Mr. Godfrey improperly split fees with Bonneville. See Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss at Exhibit "5"; R. at 278-299. 
In the complaint, Mr. Perry alleged that Mr. Godfrey violated the Dishonored Instruments 
Act, Rules 4-505 and 4-505.01 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rules 1.5 
and 5.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, and Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 100. 
Despite Mr. Perry's accusations, the Bar's Office of Professional Conduct dismissed the 
complaint: 
You have alleged that Mr Godfrey and Bonneville have a fee splitting 
arrangement by Mr. Godfrey making excessive payments for the use of the 
CUBS system when the attorneys were not previously billed for the use of 
this system. Mr. Godfrey stated that he does not engage in any fee splitting 
with Bonneville and that Bonneville is paid for the lease, equipment, 
insurance, and use of the CUBS system. The evidence is insufficient to 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Godfrey has violate 
the Rules of Professional Conduct. You have not established that Mr. 
Godfrey is fee splitting because of the large payments to Bonneville for use 
of the CUBS system. Bonneville is not prohibited from charging its 
attorneys more than its cost for the use of its system. Accordingly this 
matter is dismissed. 
(Letter from Renee Spooner to Lester M. Perry, May 18,2001 (emphasis added) {see 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss at Exhibit 
"6"; R. at 300-302). Mr. Perry attempted to appeal the dismissal of his complaint but his 
appeal was untimely. 
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E. State Court 
Plaintiffs now bring the same attack to state court. The forum and the plaintiffs 
may be different, but they press the same failed claims. They fare no better here. Judge 
Frederick ruled that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert these claims. Plaintiffs now appeal 
Judge Frederick's Order of Dismissal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
To prove standing under Utah law, a plaintiff must show he has suffered a distinct 
and palpable injury giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute. In rare 
instances, courts find standing without injury if plaintiff is the most appropriate plaintiff 
to bring the claims. In still rarer settings, courts will find standing without injury if 
plaintiff raises issues of such public importance that they ought to be decided to further 
public interest. 
Regarding the alleged fee splitting claims, Plaintiffs suffered no distinct and 
palpable injury because Mr. Godfrey was authorized by statute to collect reasonable 
attorney's fees, and the amounts sought were not unreasonable or excessive. Moreover, 
even if Mr. Godfrey split fees with Bonneville, Plaintiffs have no interest in the fees once 
they are paid. In sum, what happens to fees after they are lawfully collected is none of 
Plaintiffs' business. 
Similarly, Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their treble damages claims. Neither of 
the Plaintiffs paid Bonneville treble damages. They were not sought from Ms. Lloyd, and 
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although sought, were never collected from Ms. Haymond. Furthermore, Mr. Godfrey 
was authorized by statute to seek treble damages from Ms. Haymond. Plaintiffs, 
therefore, suffered no distinct and palpable injury regarding treble damages. 
Likewise, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the alternate tests for standing under Utah law. 
Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd clearly are not the most appropriate plaintiffs to bring these 
claims, and these are not issues of sufficient public importance in and of themselves to 
warrant standing. Therefore, this Court should affirm Judge Frederick's Order of 
Dismissal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDING REQUIREMENTS LIMIT THE POWER OF A COURT TO 
HEAR A CASE. 
A. State Common Law 
The United States Supreme Court has held that "standing principles are founded in 
concern about the proper - and properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic 
society." National Credit Union Admin, v. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998) 
(citations omitted). Standing "operates as a gatekeeper to the courthouse, allowing only 
those cases that are fit for judicial resolution." Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin v. 
D.E.S., 878 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Utah Bankers Ass 'n v. Utah Dep 7 of 
Fin. Inst., 888 P.2d 714, 717 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Standing . . . is designed to preserve the integrity of judicial adjudication by 
requiring that legal issues be adequately defined and crystalized so that 
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judicial procedures focus on specific well defined legal and factual issues. 
To that end the parties must have both a sufficient interest in the subject 
matter of the dispute and a sufficient adverseness so that the issues can be 
properly explored. 
Nafl Parks & Conservation Ass 'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909,913 (Utah 1993). 
Standing preserves the integrity of our legal system by ensuring that only those cases fit 
for judicial resolution come before the courts. Grievances better addressed by other 
branches of the government do not satisfy the standing requirements. 
Standing can be shown if a plaintiff "show[s] some distinct and palpable injury 
giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute." Order of Police Lodge v. 
Nordfelt, 869 P.2d 948, 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Nat Parks, 869 P.2d at 913. "One 
who is not adversely affected has no standing. A mere allegation of an adverse impact is 
not sufficient. There must also be some causal relationship alleged between the injury to 
the [complainant], the [defendants'] actions and the relief requested." State v. Mace, 921 
P.2d 1372, 1379 (Utah 1996). This is the traditional test for standing. 
Utah law provides two alternate tests for standing.4 In rare instances, standing may 
be found if there is "no other party who has a greater interest in the outcome of the case 
than the aggrieved party and if the issue is unlikely to be raised at all if standing is 
denied." Aldrich, 878 P.2d at 1194. Accord Nordfelt, 869 P.2d at 951; Nat. Parks, 869 
4Plaintiffs fail to address the applicability of the two alternate tests for standing 
because they believe that "the 'traditional' test of a particularized, palpable injury has 
been met." Plaintiffs' Br. at 30-31 n. 11. 
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P.2d at 913. In rarer instances, standing may be found "if the issues presented are unique 
and of such importance that they ought to be decided in the furtherance of public 
interest." Nordfelt, 869 P.2d at 951-52. Accord Aldrich, 878 P.2d at 1194; Nat'I Parks, 
869 P.2d at 913. Plaintiffs satisfy none of these tests. 
B. The Utah Constitution 
Although Utah courts have recognized three tests for standing, only the traditional 
test finds any support in the Utah constitution. The second two enjoy no constitutional 
underpinnings. The open courts provision of the Utah Constitution defines who shall 
have access to courts: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 (emphasis added). Parties who meet this requirement are 
guaranteed the "right and opportunity, in a judicial tribunal, to litigate a claim, seek relief, 
or defend one's rights." Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, \ 38, 44 P.3d 663. 
Courts should be very reluctant to grant standing when the plaintiffs have suffered no 
direct injury giving them a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute. 
[D]espite our recognition of this Court's power to grant standing where 
matters of great public interest and societal impact are concerned, this Court 
will not readily relieve a plaintiff of the statutory requirement of showing a 
real and personal interest in the dispute. 
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Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145,1150 (Utah 1983). Thus, Plaintiffs must show they have 
suffered a "distinct and palpable injury giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome of 
the dispute." Nordfelt, 869 P.2d at 950. They cannot meet this burden. 
II. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FAIL FOR LACK OF STANDING. 
A. Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey Complied with the Dishonored 
Instruments Act. 
Our economic system relies upon the mutual understanding that when a person 
issues a check, there are sufficient funds to cover the check, and the merchant who 
receives the check will be paid in full. If there was a guessing game between the issuer 
and the merchant every time a check was presented, then merchants would not accept 
checks. A check is a promise and covenant that the issuer's account contains sufficient 
funds to honor the check. When a person bounces a check, this covenant still needs to be 
enforced. However, collecting money costs money. It is only fair that the person who 
breaches the covenant pay for the costs. That is the purpose of the Dishonored 
Instruments Act. It reflects the importance of this covenant to the economy, and it 
thoroughly regulates how those checks are to be collected. 
The Dishonored Instruments Act, Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1, authorizes the holder 
of a dishonored check to take specific actions to collect what is owed. The Act "provides 
for an escalation of recoverable amounts as time elapses without payment of the 
dishonored check and as additional steps are taken to recover the check amount." 
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Checkrite Recovery Serv. v. King, 2002 UT 76, ^  5, 52 P.3d 1265. Initially, the issuer of 
a dishonored check is liable for the check amount and a "service charge" of $20.00. Utah 
Code Ann. § 7-15-l(2)(b). Before a holder may charge "collection costs" or file suit, it 
must mail statutory "written notice" to the issuer, under § 7-15-l(5)(b). If the issuer does 
not pay the check amount and the service charge of $20.00 within fifteen days from when 
the notice was mailed, the holder is authorized to collect the check amount, the service 
charge of $20.00 and "collection costs" not to exceed $20.00. Id. § 7-15-1(4). 
If the issuer does not pay these amounts within thirty days from when the notice 
was mailed, the holder has two options. First, the holder may offer not to file a lawsuit if 
the issuer pays the holder the check amount, a service charge of $20.00, collection costs 
not to exceed $20.00, treble damages, and reasonable attorney's fees not to exceed $50.00 
(if the holder retains an attorney). See id. § 7-15-l(6)(a). Second, if a lawsuit is filed 
then the issuer is liable to the holder for the check amount, interest, costs of collection, 
including all court costs and reasonable attorneys fees, and treble damages. See id. 
§ 7-15-l(7)(b). The statute specifically states the amount of treble damages which the 
holder is authorized to collect. See id. § 7-15-l(6)(a)(iii) and (7)(b)(iv). Although the 
holder is authorized to collect treble damages, the statute requires that all such damages 
"be paid to and be the property of the original payee of the check." Id. § 7-15-l(6)(b) and 
(7)(d). Bonneville is the holder of the checks it is assigned to collect. Both Bonneville 
and its attorney, Mr. Godfrey, complied with the Dishonored Instruments Act. 
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B. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Assert Their Claims Alleging Attorney Fee 
Splitting on Behalf of Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey. 
1. Plaintiffs have suffered no distinct and palpable injury. 
Plaintiffs claim to have suffered a "distinct and palpable injury giving rise to a 
personal stake in the outcome of the dispute." Order of Police Lodge v. Nordfelt, 869 
P.2d 948,950 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Plaintiffs allege that: 
Ms. Lloyd paid $150.00 to $160.00 in attorney's fees that were split with 
Bonneville . . . [and] Ms. Haymond had to hire an attorney to defend her in 
Bonneville's collection action and keep Bonneville and its attorney from 
collecting the bogus attorney's fees. 
Plaintiffs' Br. at 30. Plaintiffs have suffered no injury. 
Bonneville complied with applicable law and sought only statutory attorney's fees 
from Plaintiffs. Both versions of Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 that were in effect when Ms. 
Lloyd and Ms. Haymond wrote their respective checks allowed the "holder" to collect 
"court costs and reasonable attorney's fees." See Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1.5 A "holder" 
is "[a] person who has legal possession of a negotiable instrument and is entitled to 
receive payment on it." Black's Law Dictionary 737 (7th ed. 1999). Bonneville had legal 
possession of both checks and was entitled to receive payment on them. Thus, Bonneville 
Subsection (4) of § 7-15-1 of the 1997 amendments in effect on April 16,1999 
when Ms. Lloyd wrote her check, allowed the holder to collect "reasonable attorney's 
fees" (Addendum). Subsection (7) of § 7-15-1 of the 1999 amendments, in effect on 
February 24,2001 when Ms. Haymond wrote her check, also allowed the holder to 
collect "reasonable attorney's fees" (Addendum). 
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was a "holder" entitled to collect reasonable attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. 
§7-15-1. 
The fees sought by Bonneville were reasonable. On Bonneville's behalf, Mr. 
Godfrey sought $150.00 in attorney's fees from both Plaintiffs once he filed suit.6 This is 
the amount that Rule 4-505.01 of the Rules of Judicial Administration allows in a default 
judgment of less than $700.00. Plaintiffs can suffer no injury when Bonneville sought 
only statutory fees authorized by law. 
As Judge Benson put it in Pickering: 
The consumer plaintiffs' obligation to pay the statutory attorney fees in 
Rule 4-505.01 arises from the participation of attorneys in the collection 
case, not from the proper allocation of fees after the judgment has been 
paid. Only if attorneys were not actually involved in some material manner 
in the collection cases do the consumer plaintiffs have a claim based on 
their payment of attorney fees. Accordingly, if... the facts demonstrate 
that there was more than a token or de minimus attorney involvement in 
Bonneville's collection efforts then the Plaintiffs may not have a cognizable 
injury at law... 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, October 9,1996, at 5 {see Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss at Exhibit "1" ; R. at 245-252). Here, Mr. 
Godfrey followed the statutory collection steps to the letter, and requested only the 
6Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that Bonneville "collected up to $160.00" in 
attorney's fees from Ms. Lloyd. See Complaint at \ 71; R. at 15. However, that amount 
actually represents $150.00 in attorney's fees and $10.00 in court costs for the cost of 
serving Ms. Lloyd. 
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statutory sum. If Plaintiffs suffered some injury, it is not legally cognizable, for the law 
requires the very steps that Mr. Godfrey followed. 
Judge Campbell's order in the Heard case similarly noted that requesting 
statutorily authorized attorney's fees does not result in an injury: 
Even assuming that Bonneville's attorney's were improperly splitting fees 
with their client, plaintiff does not have standing to challenge this practice. 
He * * 
Here, plaintiff has suffered no injury from Bonneville's alleged fee splitting 
practice that could be redressed by a favorable decision. Plaintiff does not 
allege that the amount of attorney's fees collected from her by defendants 
was excessive. In fact, it is undisputed that Bonneville's attorney's 
collected the amount of attorney's fees authorized by rule 4-505.01 of the 
Code of Judicial Administration. Plaintiffs claim relates only to the later 
distribution of the fees collected by Bonneville's attorneys. Because 
plaintiff has suffered no concrete, particularized injury from defendants' 
distribution of fees, she lacks standing to bring a claim based on 
Bonneville's alleged fee splitting practice. 
Campbell Order of November 30, 1998, at 5-6 {see Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss at Exhibit "2"; R. at 253-264). Finally, 
the Tenth Circuit rejected identical claims in the Heard decision. "What Bonneville's 
attorney did with the statutory fees may violate state ethical rules. How that injures 
plaintiff, however, eludes us. It is the fundamental deficiency of Ms. Heard's stake in the 
outcome of the fee splitting issue which defeats her standing." Heard v. Bonneville 
Billing and Collections, 216 F.3d 1087 (table), 2000 WL 825721 at *5 (10th Cir. 2000) 
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(see Memorandum in Support of Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss at 
Exhibit "3"; R. at 265-269). 
Plaintiffs rely on Fuller v. Medical Collections, Inc., 891 P.2d 300 (Haw. Ct. App 
1995), for the proposition that money collected by an agency from a debtor as an 
attorney's fee is not an attorney's fee if it is not paid to the attorney. See id., at 316. 
Fuller is not binding on this Court. Nor is it persuasive, because it is materially different 
from this case. In Fuller, the appellate court vacated an order granting defendant's 
motion to dismiss. The Hawaii statute which governed collection agencies in Fuller 
provided a private cause of action to any consumer injured by a collection agency's 
unlawful acts: 
While HRS § 443B-2 (Supp. 1992) does delegate enforcement of the chapter 
to the director, enforcement may also be had through HRS chapter 480 
(1985 and Supp.1992). HRS § 443B-20 (Supp. 1992) states that, "A 
violation of this chapter by a collection agency shall constitute unfair 
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the 
conduct of any trade or commerce for the purpose of Section 480-2." HRS § 
480-2(d) (Supp. 1992), in turn, permits suit on any unfair and deceptive 
trade practice to be brought by a u consumer." HRS § 480-13(b) allows 
"fajny consumer who is injured by any unfair or deceptive act or practice 
forbidden or declared unlawful by Section 480-2 " to sue for damages. The 
complaints, thus, pray for relief under HRS § 480-13(b) (Supp. 1992) based 
on violations of HRS chapter 443B. 
Id. at 305 (emphasis added). The Hawaii court went on to hold that if: 
the collection agencies collected attorney fees knowing that, pursuant to 
contract with their attorney, they would pay their attorney less attorney fees 
than they collected, the collection agencies have in fact collected under the 
"attorney's fee" label something other than "an attorney's fee or 
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commission[.]" Obtaining a judgment for and collecting that "attorney's 
fee" under those circumstances is a serious fraud upon the court and a 
violation ofHRS Chapter 443B, and affords Plaintiffs a cause of action 
against the collection agencies for the Plaintiffs' resulting damages 
Id. at 316 (emphasis added). In stark contrast, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd rely on the 
Utah Dishonored Instruments Act and Rules 4-505 and 4-505.01 to bring their claims, 
none of which provide a private cause of action. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1; 
Rules 4-505 and 4-505.01 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Furthermore, 
Utah courts will not recognize a "private cause of action based upon state law, absent 
some specific direction from the Legislature." Broadbent v. Bd. ofEduc. of Cache 
County Sch. Dist, 910 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Therefore, Fuller is 
inapplicable. Plaintiffs have not suffered a legally cognizable injury and, therefore, have 
no standing. Plaintiffs also fail to satisfy the alternate tests for standing. 
2. Plaintiffs are not the most appropriate plaintiffs to bring these 
claims. 
Plaintiffs have failed to show that there is "no other party who has a greater 
interest in the outcome of the case than the aggrieved party and the issue is unlikely to be 
raised at all if standing is denied." Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin v. D.E.S., 878 P.2d 
1191,1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). First and foremost, there is no "issue" to raise in this 
case. As shown above, Plaintiffs have suffered no injury as a result of Mr. Godfrey 
seeking the attorney's fees authorized by statute. Because Mr. Godfrey's actions were 
consistent with Utah law, there can be no "appropriate plaintiff to bring this action. 
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Moreover, Ms. Haymond did not pay any attorney's fees to Mr. Godfrey. Therefore, she 
clearly fails this test because any party who actually paid attorney's fees would be a more 
appropriate plaintiff than Ms. Haymond. Ms. Lloyd, finally, who paid only the statutory 
fee, cannot complain they were excessive or unreasonable. 
Although Plaintiffs attempt to characterize their fee splitting claims as violations 
of the Utah Dishonored Instruments Act, and Rules 4-505 and 4-505.01, in reality their 
claims are based upon the alleged violation of Rule 5.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct which prohibits attorney fee splitting. Plaintiffs' Br. at 25 n.10; Complaint at ^ [ 
75; R. at 16-17. Violations of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct do not give rise to 
a private cause of action. See Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409,413-414 (Utah 1998). 
Furthermore, "[violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct are prosecuted by the 
Utah State Bar through the Office of Professional Conduct." Pendleton v. Utah State 
Bar, 2000 UT 96, \ 9,16 P.3d 1230. Therefore, the Office of Professional Conduct is 
also a more appropriate plaintiff to bring these claims, and Plaintiffs, therefore, fail the 
first alternate test for standing. 
3. These are not issues of great importance that should be decided 
by the Court. 
Plaintiffs have failed to show that "the issues presented are unique and of such 
importance that they ought to be decided in the furtherance of public interest." Nordfelt, 
869 P.2d at 951-52. Once again, Plaintiffs have suffered no injury as a result of Mr. 
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Godfrey seeking the attorney's fees authorized by Rule 4-505.01, and Ms. Haymond and 
Ms. Lloyd are not the most appropriate plaintiffs to bring these claims. Furthermore, 
Plaintiffs' fee splitting claims are not issues that should be decided by any court. 
Judge Benson and Judge Campbell have both declined to adjudicate identical 
grievances, finding that fee splitting is an attorney disciplinary matter for the Utah State 
Bar. Sure enough, Plaintiffs' counsel filed a lengthy complaint against Mr. Godfrey with 
the state bar raising these very allegations. Yet, it was dismissed in May of 2001. Still 
unsatisfied, Plaintiffs' counsel is trying again in court. Changing courts does change the 
disciplinary nature of the grievance. Utah courts "will not entertain generalized 
grievances that are more appropriately directed to [other] branches of the state 
government." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983). The same rule and 
result apply here. Plaintiffs have no standing. 
4. Additionally, Plaintiffs are seeking relief which the Court cannot 
grant. 
Still another reason why this is not a justiciable controversy is that Plaintiffs seek 
relief which the Court cannot grant. Plaintiffs' complaint alleges twenty-two causes of 
action and requests class certification. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants obtained 
judgments against many class members for "imaginary attorney's fees." See Complaint 
at If 77; R. at 17. Plaintiffs have requested that the trial court "enter an order vacating all 
such judgments and require Bonneville to record the order in all cases that have such 
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judgments entered." See Complaint at ffi| 77, 82, 88, 90, 94; R. 17-20. Plaintiffs, 
however, have not complied with Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
only available avenue by which to challenge unappealed final judgments. Thus, Plaintiffs 
cannot show "a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." 
Faustin v. City and County of Denver, 268 F.3d 942, 947 (10th Cir. 2001). 
In summary, Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their claims alleging attorney fee 
splitting by Mr. Godfrey and Bonneville. 
C. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Assert Their Claims Alleging the Improper 
Collection and Retention Treble Damages on Behalf of Bonneville and 
Mr. Godfrey. 
1. Plaintiffs have suffered no distinct and palpable injury. 
Plaintiffs fail the traditional test for standing because they have not suffered a 
"distinct and palpable injury giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute." 
Order of Police Lodge v. Nordfelt, 869 P.2d 948, 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Neither Ms. 
Lloyd nor Ms. Haymond paid treble damages to Bonneville. Treble damages were never 
requested of Ms. Lloyd and, in fact, were not available when Ms. Lloyd bounced her 
check. Therefore, Ms. Lloyd suffered no distinct and palpable injury. 
The 1999 amendments to the Dishonored Instruments Act (Addendum), in effect 
when Ms. Haymond bounced her check, authorized the check holder to collect triple the 
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face amount of the check as treble damages.7 Such damages, however, must be "paid to 
and be the property of the original payee of the check." Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-l(6)(b)(i) 
and (7)(e)(i). Bonneville, as holder, is authorized to collect treble damages, but may not 
"retain amounts charged or collected." They belong to the payee of the check. 
In the pre-suit notice and the complaint served upon Ms. Haymond, Bonneville 
requested treble damages as authorized by statute. However, Ms. Haymond did not pay 
any treble damages to Mr. Godfrey or Bonneville. Plaintiffs allege that "Bonneville and 
Mr. Godfrey attempted to collect such damages with the intent of keeping the damages 
for themselves." See Complaint at ^ f 47; R. at 9. Even if true, Ms. Haymond has suffered 
no injury. If any party could allege an injury it would be the original merchant who 
received the check, not Ms. Haymond. "One who is not adversely affected has no 
standing. A mere allegation of an adverse impact is not sufficient. There must also be 
some causal relationship between the injury to the [complainant], the [defendants'] 
actions and the relief requested." State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 1379 (Utah 1996). 
Ms. Haymond claims that she suffered a distinct and palpable injury because she 
had to hire a lawyer to avoid paying treble damages. See Plaintiffs' Br. at 32. However, 
to the extent that hiring a lawyer is an injury, it was the direct result of Ms. Haymond's 
7
 The Act also sets minimum and maximum limits for treble damages. The 
minimum amount is $50.00 if no suit is filed, and $100.00 if a lawsuit is filed. The 
maximum amount is $250.00 if no suit is filed, and $500.00 if a lawsuit is filed. See Utah 
Code Ann. §7-15-1(6) and (7). 
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own actions. First, Ms. Haymond bounced a check. Second, she failed to pay the check 
amount and a minor service charge in a timely manner. Had she done so, treble damages 
would not have been an issue. It was only after Ms. Haymond bounced a check, and then 
was derelict in correcting the problem, that Bonneville filed suit. Ms. Haymond did not 
hire an attorney solely to avoid paying treble damages. She hired Mr. Perry to defend her 
in the collection lawsuit. If Ms. Haymond suffered any injury at all, it was self inflicted 
and does not confer standing to bring these claims. Therefore, under the traditional test, 
Plaintiffs lack standing on the fee splitting claims. 
2. Plaintiffs are not the most appropriate plaintiffs to bring these 
claims. 
Plaintiffs have failed to show that there is "no other party who has a greater 
interest in the outcome of the case than the aggrieved party and the issue is unlikely to be 
raised at all if standing is denied." Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin v. D.E.S., 878 P.2d 
1191,1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this test, for they have no 
"interest in the outcome." Neither Plaintiff paid treble damages. Therefore, anyone who 
actually paid treble damages would be a more appropriate plaintiff. Additionally, even if 
Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey improperly retained treble damages, the payees of the checks 
would be the injured parties and would be the appropriate plaintiffs. "Plaintiffs] may not 
allege jeopardy or injury to others in order to confer standing upon [their] own claims." 
York v. Unqualified Washington County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679, 680 (Utah 
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1986). Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd clearly are not the most appropriate plaintiffs to 
bring these claims. 
3. These are not issues of great importance that should be decided 
in the furtherance of public interest. 
Plaintiffs have failed to show that "the issues presented are unique and of such 
importance that they ought to be decided in the furtherance of public interest." Order of 
Police Lodge v. NordfelU 869 P.2d 948,950 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The treble damages 
claims are not of sufficient public importance in and of themselves to warrant standing. 
There is nothing in the Complaint to support the argument that these issues need to be 
decided and that they need to be decided right now. To the contrary, it was appropriate 
for the Judge Frederick to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims and wait to address these issues if 
and when they are brought by an appropriate plaintiff who has suffered a distinct and 
palpable injury. 
In summary, Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their claims alleging the improper 
collection and retention of treble damages by Mr. Godfrey and Bonneville. 
IIL JUDGE FREDERICK'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL DID NOT VIOLATE 
PLAINTIFFS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court violated Article I, Sections 7 and 11 of the Utah 
Constitution by dismissing their claims and denying them their right to a day in court. 
See Plaintiffs' Br. at 32-34. This argument, however, is being raised for the first time on 
appeal and, therefore, should not be considered by the Court. Furthermore, even if the 
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Court were to consider Plaintiffs' untimely constitutional argument, this argument fails on 
the merits because Plaintiffs lack standing. 
A. Plaintiffs' Constitutional Argument is Being Raised for the First Time 
on Appeal. 
Plaintiffs' constitutional argument, claiming violation of the due process and open 
courts provisions, is being raised for the first time on appeal. Plaintiffs failed to raise this 
argument in their memoranda filed in opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. See 
R. at 322-431. Plaintiffs also failed to raise this argument during the hearing on 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. See Transcript of June 3,2002 Hearing; R. at 479 (pp. 
1-14). 
This Court has repeatedly held that "[i]ssues not raised at trial cannot be argued for 
the first time on appeal." Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) (citation 
omitted); accord Treffv. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, ] 9 n.4,26 P.3d 212 ("We will not 
address any arguments raised for the first time on appeal."); Certified Sur. Group, Ltd. v. 
Utah Inc., 960 P.2d 904, 906 n.3 (Utah 1998) ("Issues raised for the first time on appeal 
will generally not be considered."). "This rule applies to all claims, including 
constitutional questions." Monson, 928 P.2d at 1022. Because Plaintiffs failed to raise 
their constitutional argument in the trial court, it should not be considered on appeal. See 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah 1985) ("Failure to raise the point [below] 
precludes its consideration here."). 
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B. Plaintiffs' Constitutional Rights were not Violated Because Plaintiffs 
Lack Standing to Sue, 
Even if the Court considers Plaintiffs' untimely constitutional argument, that 
argument fails on the merits because Plaintiffs lack standing to sue. The due process 
provision of the Utah Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law." Utah Const, art. I, § 7. The open courts 
provision of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person,^ an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 (emphasis added). 
The protections provided under due process and open courts provisions are not 
triggered unless a plaintiff has standing to sue. This Court recently held that: 
[T]he open courts provision guarantees litigants access to the courts, i.e., a 
day in court, affording them the opportunity to litigate any justiciable 
controversy. However, that right is limited to those individuals who 
actually have a viable claim, because the right is inextricably connected 
with that claim.. 
Applied Med. Tech. v. Eames, 2002 UT 18, \ 16,44 P.3d 699; accord Miller v. USAA 
Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, ^ | 38 ("Parties to a suit... are constitutionally entitled to 
litigate any justiciable controversy..."). The requirement that a plaintiff have a viable 
claim and a justiciable controversy presupposes that the plaintiff has suffered some 
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legally cognizable injury. See Utah Const, art. I, § 11 ("All courts shall be open, and 
every person,ybr an injury done to him...); Walston v. Lockhart, 62 S.W.3d 257,258-59 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2002) ("The requirement of standing is implicit in the . . . open courts 
provision, which contemplates access to the courts only for those litigants suffering an 
injury."). In summary, implicit in the due process and open courts provisions of the Utah 
Constitution is the requirement that the plaintiff have standing to sue. 
In the present case, Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their claims. Even assuming 
Plaintiffs' allegations are true, they have not suffered a distinct and palpable injury giving 
rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute. Because Plaintiffs lack standing, 
they cannot claim a violation of the due process and open courts provisions of the Utah 
Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the trial court's Order of Dismissal should be affirmed. 
DATED this 6^ day of December, 2002. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Andrew M. hio/se 
D. Jason Hawkins 
Attorneys for Defendant Ted K. Godfrey 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 7. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
CHAPTER 15. DISHONORED INSTRUMENTS 
Copyright (C) 1953-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed 
Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved. 
-15-1 Civil liability of issuer -- Notice of action -- Collection costs. 
(1) Any person who makes, draws, signs, or issues any check, draft, order, or 
iher instrument upon any depository institution, whether as corporate agent or 
zherwise, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
>rporation any money, merchandise, property, or other thing of value or paying 
>r any service, wages, salary, or rent is liable to the holder of the check, 
raft, order, or other instrument if: 
(a) the check, draft, order, or other instrument: 
(i) is not honored upon presentment; and 
(ii) is marked "refer to maker"; or 
(b) the account upon which the check, draft, order, or other instrument has 
en made or drawn: 
(i) does not exist; 
(ii) has been closed; or 
(iii) does not have sufficient funds or sufficient credit for payment in 
11 of the check, draft, or other instrument. 
(2) (a) The holder of the check, draft, order, or other instrument that has 
en dishonored may: 
(i) give written or verbal notice of dishonor to the person making, 
awing, signing, or issuing the check, draft, order, or other instrument; and 
(ii) impose a service charge that may not exceed $20. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), a holder of a check, draft, order, or 
ier instrument that has been dishonored may not charge the service charge 
emitted under Subsection (2)(a) if: 
(i) the holder redeposits the check, draft, order, or other instrument; and 
(ii) that check, draft, order, or other instrument is honored. 
(3) Prior to filing an action based upon this section, the holder of a 
shonored check, draft, order, or other instrument shall give the person 
:ing, drawing, signing, or issuing the dishonored check, draft, order, or 
ler instrument written notice of intent to file civil action, allowing the 
rson seven days from the date on which the notice was mailed to tender payment 
full, plus the service charge imposed for the dishonored check, draft, order, 
other instrument. 
4) In a civil action, the person making, drawing, signing, or issuing the 
>ck, draft, order, or other instrument is liable to the holder for: 
(a) the amount of the check, draft, order, or other instrument; 
(b) interest; and 
(c) all costs of collection, including all court costs and reasonable 
orneys' fees. 
5) As used in this section, "costs of collection" includes reasonable 
pensation, as approved by the court, for time expended if the collection is 
sued personally by the holder and not through an agent. 
Copr. (C) West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works ^*~ 
Wkstlaw. 
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ST S 7-151 
tory: C. 1953, 7-15-1, enacted by L. 1981, r.h Id, «s 13; 1986, ch. 29, s 1; 
8, ch. 52, s 1; 1988, ch. 128, s 1; 1997, rh. MS u 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
epeals and Reenactments. -- Laws 1981, ch. 16, s 1 repeals former ss 7-151 
5-3 (L. 1969, ch. 240, ss 1, 3; 1977, ch. 15, ss 1, 3; 1979, ch. 92, ss 1, 
relating to fraudulent checks. Laws 1981, ch. 16, s 13 enacts present ss 7-
•1 and 7-15-2., Former s 7-1 5-2 was repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 92, s 3. 
anendment Notes. - The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, subdivided 
^sections (1) and (2) adding the Subsection (3) designation, redesignated 
mer Subsections (3) and (4) as (4) and (5), and added Subsection (2)(b). 
Iross-References. Criminal penalties for issuing bad check, b "in-h-505, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
sufficient funds. 
Knowledge of liuJdei , 
:ed. 
sufficient funds. 
Knowledge of holder, 
rhere was no fraudulent issuance of a check, and plaintiff was not entitled to 
torney fees in an action on the check, where the check was issued to pay on a 
st due account, plaintiff accepted it with knowledge that there were 
sufficient funds to cover it and agreed to hold it for two weeks before 
esenting it to the bank. Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1977). 
This section requires that the signator of a bad check personally receive 
nefits, services, or money transfer or, in the alternative, have actual 
owledge that the check is drawn on insufficient funds in order to be held 
able. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989) . 
The trial court committed reversible error in construing this section as 
posing strict liability on a corporate employee for signing corporate checks 
behalf of her employer in payment for corporate obligations, where employee 
d no interest, beneficial or otherwise, in the checking account, the funds in 
e account, or in the corporation, had no knowledge or reason to believe that 
.e checks in question were drawn on insufficient funds, and functioned merely 
i a scribe in executing checks for her employer. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. 
>. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989). 
Cited in Peterson Plumbing Supply v Bern:- ' * *h Ct. App. 
>90) . 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. -- Criminal and Civil Liability for Bad Checks in Utah, 19 70 
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U.C.A. 1953 s 7-15-1 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 7. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
CHAPTER 15. DISHONORED INSTRUMENTS 
Copyright (C) 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc; one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
-15-1 Definitions --Civil liability of issuer --Notice of action -- Collection 
osts --Exemptions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Check" means a payment instrument on a depository institution including 
(i) check; 
(ii) draft; 
(iii) order; or 
(iv) other instrument. 
(b) "Issuer11 means a person who makes, draws, signs, or issues a check, 
tether as corporate agent or otherwise, for the purpose of: 
(i) obtaining from any person any money, merchandise, property, or oth€*r 
ing of value; or 
(ii) paying for any service, wages, salary, or rent. 
(c) "Mailed" means the day that a notice is properly deposited in the United 
ates mail. 
(2) (a) An issuer of a check is liable to the holder of the check if: 
(i) the check: 
(A) is not honored upon presentment; and 
(B) is marked "refer to maker"; 
(ii) the account upon which the check is made or drawn: 
(A) does not exist; 
(B) has been closed; or 
(C) does not have sufficient funds or sufficient credit for payment in 
LI of the check; or 
(iii) (A) the check is issued in partial or complete fulfillment of a valid 
i legally binding obligation; and 
(B) the issuer stops payment on the check with the intent to: 
(I) fraudulently defeat a possessory lien; or 
(II) otherwise defraud the holder of the check. 
(b) If an issuer of a check is liable under Subsection (2)(a)# the issuer is 
ible for: 
(i) the check amount; and 
(ii) a service charge of $20. 
[3) (a) The holder of a check that has been dishonored may: 
(i) give written or oral notice of dishonor to the issuer of the check; and 
(ii) waive all or part of the service charge imposed under Subsection 
(b). 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(b), a holder of a check that has been 
honored may not collect and the issuer is not liable for the service charge 
osed under Subsection (2)(b) if: 
(i) the holder redeposits the check; and 
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(ii) that check is honored. 
4) If the issuer does not pay the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b) within 
calendar days from the day on which the notice required under Subsection (5) 
mailed, the issuer is liable for: 
(a) the amount owed under Subsection (2) 
(b) collection costs not to exceed $20. 
(5) (a) A holder shall provide written notice to an issuer before: 
(i) charging collection costs under Subsection (4) in addition to the 
>unt owed under Subsection (2)(b); or 
(ii) filing an action based upon this section. 
(b) The written notice required under Subsection. !"l"») (a! shall notify the 
suer of the dishonored check that: 
(i) if the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b) is not paid within 15 
Lendar days from the day on which the notice is mailed, the issuer is liable 
r: 
(A) the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b); and 
(B) collection costs under Subsection (4); and 
(ii) the holder may file civil action if the issuer does not pay to the 
lder the amount owed under Subsection (4) within 30 calendar days from the day 
which the notice is mailed. 
(6) (a) If the issuer has not paid the holder the amounts owed under 
bsection (4) within 30 calendar days from the day on which the notice required 
Subsection (5) is mailed, the holder may offer to not file civil action under 
is section if the issuer pays the holder: 
(i) the amount owed under Subsection (2) (b) ; 
(ii) the collection costs under Subsection (4); 
(iii) an amount that: 
(A) is equal to the greater of: 
(I) $50; or 
(II) triple the check amount; and 
(B) does not exceed the check amount plus $250; and 
(iv) if the holder retains an attorney to recover on the dishonored check, 
tasonable attorney's fees not to exceed $50. 
(b) (i) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), all amounts charged or collected 
tder Subsection (6)(a)(iii) shall be paid to and be the property of the 
riginal payee of the check. 
(ii) A person who is not the original payee may not retain any amounts 
larged or collected under Subsection (6)(a)(iii). 
(iii) The original payee of a check may not contract for a person to retain 
ly amounts charged or collected under Subsection (6)(a)(iii) 
(7) (a) A civil action may not be filed under this section unless the issuer 
ails to pay the amounts owed under Subsection (4) within 30 calendar days from 
le day on which the notice required by Subsection (5) is mailed. 
(b) In a civil action, the issuer of the check is liable to the hoJder It. - ; 
(i) the check amount; 
(ii) interest; 
(iii) all costs of collection, including all court costs and reasonable 
ttorneys' fees; and 
(iv) damages: 
(A) equal to the greater of: 
(I) $100; or 
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(II) triple the check amount; and 
(B) not to exceed the check amount plus $500. 
(c) If an issuer is held liable under Subsection (7)(b), notwithstanding 
ubsection (7)(b), a court may waive all or part of the amounts owed under, 
ubsections (7)(b)(ii) through (iv) upon a finding of good cause. 
(d) (i) Notwithstanding Subsection (7)(b), all amounts charged or collected 
rider Subsection (7) (b) (iv) shall be paid to and be the property of the original 
ayee of the check. 
(ii) A person who is not the original payee may not retain any amounts 
larged or collected under Subsection (7)(b)(iv). 
(iii) The original payee of a check may not contract for a person to retain 
ly amounts charged or collected under Subsection (7)(b)(iv). 
(8) This section may not be construed to prohibit the holder of the check from 
seking relief under any other applicable statute or cause of action. 
(9) (a) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, a holder of a 
teck is exempt from this section if: 
(i) the holder: 
(A) is a depository institution; or 
(B) a person that receives a payment on behalf of a depository 
stitution; 
(ii) the check is a payment on a loan that originated at the depository 
stitution that: 
(A) is the holder; or 
(B) on behalf of which the holder received the payment; and 
(iii) the loan contract states a specific service charge for dishonor, 
(b) A holder exempt under Subsection (6)(a) may contract with an issuer for 
* collection of fees or charges for the dishonor of a check. 
story: C. 1953, 7-15-1, enacted by L. 1981, ch. 16, s 13; 1986, ch. 29, s 1; 
38, ch. 52, s 1; 1988, ch. 128, s 1; 1997, ch. 245, s 1; 1999, ch. 100, s 1; 
)9, ch. 171, s 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
lepeals and Reenactments. --Laws 1981, ch. 16, s 1 repeals former ss 7-15-1, 
.5-3 (L. 1969, ch. 240, ss 1, 3; 1977, ch. 15, ss 1, 3; 1979, ch. 92, ss 1, 
relating to fraudulent checks. Laws 1981, ch. 16, s 13 enacts present ss 7-
•1 and 7-15-2. Former s 7-15-2 was repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 92, s 3. 
jnendment Notes. --The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, subdivided 
•sections (1) and (2), adding the Subsection (3) designation; redesignated 
itier Subsections (3) and (4) as (4) and (5); substituted »$20fl for "$15M in 
•section (2)(a)(ii); added Subsection (2) (b) ; and made stylistic changes, 
'he 1999 amendment by ch. 100, effective May 3, 1999, rewrote the section, 
he 1999 amendment by ch. 171, effective May 3, 1999, added the last 
section, establishing exemptions. 
his section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research 
General Counsel. 
ross-References. --Criminal penalties for issuing bad check, s 76-6-505. 
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WESTS UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
PART I. JUDICIAL COUNCIL RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
CHAPTER 4. OPERATION OF THE COURTS 
ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE 
Copr. '* WI'VKL f Innjp 1'OOH All nfMtn reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 9-15-2002. 
N ULE 1605 ATTORNEY FEES AFFIDAVITS 
Intent. To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format fui nffidavits in support of attorney fees 
Applicability. This rule shall govern the award uf attorney Itvs in 
Statement of the Rule. 
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be filed with the court and set forth 
specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work performed by the attorney, the 
number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the matter 
to the stage for which attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for 
comparable legal services. 
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours by persons other than attorneys, for time spent, 
work completed and hourly rate billed. 
(3) If the affidavit is in support of attorney fees for services rendered to a person or entity who has 
been assigned an interest in a claim for the purpose of collection or hired by the obligee to collect a 
debt, the affidavit shall also state that the attorney is not sharing the fee or any portion thereof in 
violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4. 
(4) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sum which it is expected will require 
considerable additional work to collect, the following phrase may be included in the judgment after 
an award consistent with the time spent to the point of default judgment, to cover additional fees 
incurred in pursuit of collection: 
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE AUGMENTED IN 
THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN 
COLLECTING SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL BE 
ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT." 
(5) Attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to this rule or pursuant to Rule 4- 505.1. 
[Amended effective November 15,1995.] 
Judicial Administration Rule 4-505 
UT R J ADMIN Rule 4-506 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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WESTS UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
PART L JUDICIAL COUNCIL RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
CHAPTER 4. OPERATION OF THE COURTS 
ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE 
Copr. ° West Group 2002. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 9-15-2002. 
RULE 4-505.01. AWARDS OF ATTORNEY FEES IN CIVIL DEFAULT JUDGMENTS WITH A 
PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF $5,000 OR LESS. 
Intent: 
To provide for uniformity in awards of attorney fees in civil default judgments with a principal 
damages amount of $5,000 or less. 
To provide for notice of the amount of attorney fees that may be awarded in the event of default. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall govern awards of attorney fees in civil default judgments with a principal damages 
amount of $5,000 or less in which the claimant elects to seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to 
this rule. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) When reasonable attorney fees are provided for by contract or statute and the claimant elects to 
seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to this rule, such fees shall be computed as follows: 
Principal Amount of 
Damages, Exclusive of Costs 
and Interest,Attorney 
Between 
$0.00 
700.01 
900.01 
1,000.01 
1,500.01 
2,000.01 
2,500.01 
3,000.01 
3,500.01 
4,000.01 
4,500.01 
and:Fees Allowed 
$700.00 
900.00 
1,000.00 
1,500.00 
2,000.00 
2,500.00 
3,000.00 
3,500.00 
4,000.00 
4,500.00 
5,000.00 
$150.00 
175.00 
200.00 
250.00 
325.00 
400.00 
475.00 
550.00 
625.00 
700.00 
775.00 
(2) Reference to this rule and the amount of attorney fees allowed pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be 
stated with particularity in the body or prayer of the complaint. 
(3) When a statute provides the basis for the award of attorney fees, reference to the statutory 
authority shall be included in the complaint. 
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(4) Clerks may enter civil default judgments which include attorney fees awarded pursuant to this 
rule. 
(5) Attorney fees awarded pursuant to this rule may be augmented after judgment pursuant to Rule 4-
505. When the court considers a motion for augmentation of attorney fees awarded pursuant to this 
rule, it shall consider the attorney time spent prior to the entzy of judgment, the amount of attorney 
fees included in the judgment, and the statements contained in the affidavit supporting the motion for 
augmentation. 
(6) Prior to entry of a judgment which grants attorney fees pursuant to this rule, any party may move 
the court to depart from the fees allowed by paragraph (1) of this rule. Such application shall be made 
pursuant to Rule 4- 505. 
(7) If a contract or other document provides for an award of attorney fees, an original or copy of the 
document shall be made a part of the file before attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to this rule. 
(8) No affidavit for attorney fees need be filed in order to receive an award of attorney fees 11 u r SUM nl it i 
this rule. 
(9) No attorney fees awarded pursuant to this rule, nor portion thereof, may be shared in iolalion of 
Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4. 
[Amended effective November 15,1995; November 1, 2002.] 
Judicial Administration RULE 4-505.01 
UTR J ADMIN MILE 4 MIS 01 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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"•"DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN f 8 2002 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA HAYMOND and MELANIE A. ] 
LLOYD, for themselves and for all others ] 
Similarly situated; ] 
Plaintiffs ] 
vs. ] 
BONNEVILLE BILLING & ] 
COLLECTIONS, INC., a Utah corporation; ; 
TED K. GODFREY, DAVID TOLLER; ] 
And JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10; ] 
Defendants. ] 
1 ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
> Civil No.: 010911607 
> Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss and Defendants Bonneville Billing & 
Collections, Inc/s and David Toller's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion For 
Summary Judgment came regularly for hearing on June 3, 2002 at 9:00 a.m. before the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick. Plaintiffs were represented by Lester A. Perry, Defendant Ted 
K. Godfrey was represented by Andrew M. Morse and Defendants Bonneville Billing & 
Collections, In:, and !>/'u! Toller weie icpresented by Rebecca I Hill "The Court liean;'1 "ilr 
arguments of counsel and considered the parties' memoranda and material on file, and good cause 
appearing therefor, 
IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are 
granted. The Court rules that Defendants' arguments as set forth in their Memoranda are well-taken 
as Plaintiffs have no standing or basis under Utah law for a right of action against Defendants as 
they allege in their Complaint. Plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
Parties to hen (In >• « wo costs 1 his Ouiei o! Dismissal concerns Plaintiffs1 entire action a/jamst 
Defendants and is final for purposes of appeal. 
D .- IB^davof e l u M - , 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form. /7 
Uesjer A. Perry 
HpOLE & KING, L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
*f 
J. DennisiFredbrick 
Third Dif trict/Court Judge 
o 
Approved as to form: 
Andrew M. Morse 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Ted K. Godfrey 
Approved as to form: 
Rebecca L. Hill 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.G 
Attorneys for Defendants Bonneville 
Billing & Collections, Inc. and David Toller 
3 
